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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS ACT
An able apologist, for and critic of the Negotiable Instruments Law has said, that, to judge the act fairly, we
must "realize that the Commissioners (who framed it)
were attempting to codify the law. Their aim was not to
reform the law of negotiable paper. It was to state accurately and concisely the existing law." Their aim as we
conceive, was to express a law of negotiable instruments,
with a view to the adoption of their expression by the
legislatures of many states, and, the conversion of it into
law for these states. As the laws of the states already
differed from each other, such enactment implied the
repeal in any particular state of more or less considerable
portions of the existing law thereof. In a good many respects the Act of 1901 has changed the negotiable instruments law of Pennsylvania. Not merely a new expression
of the old law was then, the aim of the commissioners, but, at least a partial reformation of it.
One is surprised to find, on examining the law, that it
does not profess to cover the entire subject. Why it does
not, is not revealed. Did the commissioners grow weary
before completing their task? Whatever the cause, they
were apparently conscious that they had omitted problems
2Charles L. McKeehan, Esq.
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that had been theretofore provided for, for they stipulate
that "In any case not provided for in this act the rules of
the law merchant shall govern."
This expression, "the rules of the law merchant" reveals that the commissioners were subject to the hallucination that there was such a thing as the "law merchant."
Law is the body of principles for the regulation of human
action, which the law making organ of any particular
state or country has elaborated. There is in England, no
law but the law of England; in Pennsylvania, but the law
of Pennsylvania; in New York but the law of New York.
The law may be about negotiable paper, about bailments,
about contracts, about crimes, about land, but in every
case it is the law of England, or of Pennsylvania, or of
New York, about these subjects. There is no more a law
about bills and notes, detached from any particular sovereignty, than there is a law about real property or about
torts. It may be that on a given subject, the law of one
sovereignty is precisely like that of another sovereignty,
but they are not, for that reason, one law but two laws,
English, Pennsylvania, New York. To say that the law
merchant shall govern, where the act of 1901 is silent, is
hardly more than to say that the pre-existing law in this
state, about negotiable paper, shall continue in so far as
not modified or repealed by this act.
We propose to notice some of the infelicities and
obscurities with which the negotiable instruments act
unfortunately abounds.
Sect. 1, Art. 1: An instrument must contain a promise or order to "pay a sum certain in money." A sum in
money! What is a sum? An amount? A sum in money
is an amount of money?
The instrument "must be payable on demand or at a
fixed or determinable future time." A promise or order
is to do something which has not yet been done. It must
be done, then, at some future time. Of millions of possible times, at which? Something, somebody must deter-
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mine. The payee may, by making a demand when he
chooses. The time will be determinable, within certain
Or, a certain intervening time
limits, by his volition.
may be specified; e. g. 3 months after date; or, on July
1st. Or, some event, possible, or certain to occur, but the
time of whose occurrence is not predictable, may be selected, to define the time for making the payment. The
act says "fixed or determinable." Are these two properties, or but one? Apparently, they are but one, for Sect.
4 says an instrument is payable at a "determinable" time,
when it is payable "at a fixed period after date or sight."
Why then was the word "fixed" used?
Section 4 says the time of payment may be defined
as "on or before a fixed or determinable future time specified."
Does this mean that the instrument may impose
an obligation to pay "before" this specified time? If so
on what event is this duty of anticipatory payment to
arise? Will the volition of the payee, expressed in a demand, suffice? May it be some other event, contingent or
certain to occur, whose actual occurrence before the specified time shall precipitate the duty of payment?
Sect. 1, Art. 1, states that the instrument must contain
an "unconditional promise or order to pay," etc. Sect. 3
says virtually that the promise or order is not made conditional by the indication of a fund from which the maker
of a note or drawee of a bill is to reimburse himself, or
of an account which is to be "debited with the amount."
The section also states that a
With what "amount?"
statement in the instrument of the transaction which gave
rise to it, does not defeat its negotiability.
This section is criticised by Prof. Ames, because, as he
thinks, it does not make conditional, and therefore nonnegotiable, a promise to pay money which is collateral security for another debt due to the payee, although the fact
that it is collateral is expressed in the instrument. But,
why is not the distinction taken, between a collateral note,
payable after the principal debt, and one payable before?
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If B, indebted to A on a bond, mortgage, or otherwise, the
debt being payable Aug. 1st, 1916, gives a note for the
amount, payable July 1st, 1916, and expressed to be a
collateral security for the debt, why should it be said that
the note payable July 1st, is conditional on non-payment
of the debt which is payable Aug. 1st? Charles L. McKeehan, Esq., agrees with Prof. Ames that a note expressed
to be collateral to a debt, is ipso facto conditioned on the
non-payment of the debt.
The commissioners intended by the second clause of
Sect. 3, to secure negotiability to instruments although they
were given for the price of an article the title to which was
reserved to the vendor until payment.
Charles L. MoKeehan, Esq., shows that such notes are usually, though
not always, regarded as negotiable,2 and he states that the
object of the commissioners was to adopt the principle that
they are negotiable. He thinks however, that some courts
may fail to find this purpose in the statute and may continue to deem notes of this sort non-negotiable. Such also
is Prof. Ames' opinion. The object of securing uniformity
of law in the different states will thus be frustrated. Why
were the inventors of the law not more explicit?
Sect. 5 states that an instrument containing a promise
or an order to do any act additional to the payment of
money, is not negotiable.
Why was this dogma
adhered to?
Why should bony, fide transferees
of such an instrument be unable to enforce the
money part, because unable to enforce the rest? So, why
did the courts say, as they did, that the inclusion in the
promise, of a contingent and uncertain sum of money,
should vitiate the negotiableness of the note, even for the
certain sum? In some jurisdictions, e. g. in Pennsylvania,
the act has made the instrument negotiable even for its
uncertain part. Why did the commissioners not have originality enough to make a composite promise to pay money
2Cf. Gazlay v. Riegel, 16 Super. 501.
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and to do other things, negotiable at least as to the promise to pay money?
Confession of Judgment
Some courts had held that a warrant of attorney to
confess judgment contained in an otherwise negotiable instrument, rendered it non-negotiable.
The flimsiness of
the reason for so holding may be discovered by a perusal of
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. St. 346. Gibson, C. J., holds such
a note non-negotiable (1) because to be negotiable, a note
must be framed in the "fewest possible words."
(He
admits that this is a "minor" reason. He might have
said it was minuscule) (2) because it must be "free from
contingencies or conditions that would embarrass it in its
course." But what is "its course?" Payment at maturity
will embarrass it in its course. It is partially negotiable,
even after maturity, until it is paid. A restrictive endorsement may arrest the note or bill in its course, by making it
further non-negotiable. (See Sect. 36). Yet such liability to
the loss of negotiability before maturity, has not been supposed to be inconsistent with negotiability until such restrictive endorsement. How can the destructibility of the note,
before maturity, by absorption into a judgment, interfere
with negotiability until such absorption? (3) The presence
of the warrant evinces that "the object of the parties was
not a general but a special one?" (An utterly unmeaning
expression.) What is a general object? The justice alludes
to the fact that by entering the judgment, the debt is "attached, as an incumbrance to the maker's land." But suppose he has no land? And what hinders a lien for a debt
expressed by a note in favor of the holder? A mortgage
may secure a note, which does not for that reason, lose its
negotiability. (4) A warrant to confess, being collateral to
the note, would not pass to a subsequent holder by endorsement or delivery. Therefore the promise could not pass!
But why does a judge dogmatically say that the warrant
shall not and therefore cannot pass? The waiver of stay
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Why not the warrant? s
and exemption laws can pass.
But, even if the warrant could not pass, why should not
the promise?
The unsubstantiality of the objections to the negotiability of a note with warrant to confess judgment after
maturity has been discerned by the commissioners. They
have, for no adequate reason, while abolishing the principle
that a warrant to confess judgment after maturity shall
destroy negotiableness, contented themselves with allowing
courts of the various states to differ as to the effect of a
warrant to confess before maturity, unless we are to understand the express assertion that a warrant to confess if
the note be not paid at maturity, is not inconsistent with
negotiability, to be an implied assertion that a warrant to
confess before maturity shall render the note non-negotiable. 4
There are some states where the effect of a warrant
of attorney on negotiability has not undergone decision.
Why, in such states, should the commissioners have influenced the adoption of the principle that the incorporation of a procedural device for the prompt legal enforcement of the promise should render the instrument non-negotiable?
The 4th clause of section 5, while apparently forbiding, to a negotiable instrument the capacity to be transformed before maturity into a judgment, does allow of the
transformability of it from an obligation to pay money,
into one to do some other thing, consistently with its negotiability. At his election, the holder may require of the
maker, something else than the payment of money!
Instruments Payable to Bearer
Sect. 9. When an instrument purports to be payable
to bearer, that is, uses the word "bearer" to describe the
sCf. Fritz v. Horton, 243 Pa. 187.
4National Bank v. Beaver, 25 Super. 494, holds that a note with
authority to enter judgment "as of any term," is not negotiable.
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payee, there can be no question that it is so payable. If
payable in terms to a named person or bearer, it is likewise payable to the bearer, as if no person had been named.
His endorsement is unnecessary, in order to entitle any
bearer to payment. The section says, that when the instrument is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it, it is payable to bearer. Two things ard necessary:
(1) that the payee named should be a fictitious or nonexisting person i. e. a person, which person is fictitious or
non-existing.
(2) The fictitiousness or non-existence of
this person must at the time of the issue of the instrument,
be known to the drawer (of a bill) or the maker (of a
note). Non-existent things need not be fictitious. There
are billions of non-existent men. As soon as any specific
man is imagined, assumed, to exist, who does not in fact exist, a man is feigned; he is fictitious. The act of naming
a non-existent man, as payee, makes this man fictitious.
The two words are therefore virtually one. There may be
a real man who is known by a certain name. It is possible
for the maker of a note to use a name of an existing man,
as payee, without the intention that he shall be the payee,
and with the intention to make payee, an unnamed person, to be ascertained by the delivery to him of the instrument. In this case, since the bearer of the name is not the
payee, and since the name is not employedto stand for any
determinate person, and therefore the promise to pay is
not complete (since there can be no payment without payment to somebody) until delivery of the instrument, with
intention that the deliveree shall be the payee, such an instrument is payable in terms to a non-existent, a fictitious
person. Although an existent person bears the name, he
is not intended by that name. No existing person is intended by it. 5 If the instrument is, in the intention of the
maker, not payable to any determinate person, whether
Ba

5Snyder v. Corn. Exch. Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599; Cf. Seaboard Nat.
v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26.
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there be an actual person who bears thx name, or not, the
instrument is properly treated as one payable to the bearer. It follows that since an endorsement, if made, must be
made by some actual person, the maker must intend to
make the instrument payable to bearer without endorsement. Hence is inferred the passing of title to the deliveree, even when there is an endorsement by the maker, in
the fictitious name.
Instruments not in terms payable to bearer, may become payable to bearer; e. g. by an endorsement in blank
by the payee, or, after a special endorsement by him, by an
endorsement in blank by his special endorsee.
It was
formerly held that, when the payee endorsed in blank, the
note became payable to bearer, whether later endorsements
were special or in blank., The holder was obliged when
suing, to prove only the endorsement of the payee.
No
proof of any endorsement by the person from whom he
obtained it or from any antecedent owner, later than the
payee, was necessary.
The negotiable instruments act
makes a bill payable to bearer when it is expressed to be
so payable, or when, not purporting to be payable to
bearer, its only or ultimate endorsement is in blank.
Charles L. McKeehan, Esq., sees in this expression a declaration that, if any endorsement, later than that of the payee
is special, even though the payee's is in blank, the instrument is not payable to bearer, until a blank endorsement
following and that it ceases to be so payable as soon as another special endorsement follows. It is unfortunate, if
this is the correct interpretation, that the act is not more
explicit.
The Date
Sect. 12 states that an instrument is not invalid because ante-dated or post-dated, provided this is not done
for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. Does this mean that,
if it is done for such purpose, the instrument shall be
eMitchell v. Fuller, 15 Pa. 268; Smith v. Clarke, 1 Espin. 180.
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invalid? If so, why not say so? But why should it be
invalid as to bonm fide purchasers, because of the falseness
of the date for an illegal purpose?
If the purpose itself
would not make it invalid, why should the use of a false
date, in order to effect this purpose, make the note or bill
void?
There follows the statement, "the person to whom an
instrument so dated is delivered, acquires the title thereto
as of the date of delivery." At what other time could he
acquire the title? Before delivery? After delivery? This
statement is superfluous. The 16th section declares every
contract on a negotiable instrument incomplete and revocable until delivery for the purpose of giving effect thereto.
Is that what the framers of the act really meant? Is the
contract revocable? Or, is there in existence, any contract,
until delivery with the purpose of giving effect to the instrument?
Incomplete Instrument
Sect. 15 is censurable for obscurity. Does it mean
"Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered
(by the person whom it purports to charge) it will not,
(if got possession of by another, without his consent and)
completed and negotiated without authority (of the person
whom it purports to change) be a valid contract in the
hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery?" The act does
not say that it shall be a valid contract, as against any
whose signature is placed on it after negotiation. Will
it?
Presumed Delivery
As between immediate parties the delivery of an instrument or its delivery with the authority of the maker,
drawer, acceptor or endorser, may be denied, and the title
of the person in possession thus refuted. "Where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid
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delivery by all parties prior to him is conclusively presumed." This must be subject to the exception of cases covered by Sect. 16. "A valid and intentional delivery" is presumed, says the section. But can a delivery be valid, which
is not intentional? Can an intentional delivery fail to be
valid?
Liability of One Signing As Agent
If one signs in such way as to indicate that he signs
for a principal, he is not liabre on the instrument, says Sect.
20, if he was duly authorized. But, is he liable on the instrument, if he was not duly authorized? If the enacters
of the statute intended to say so, why have they not said
so distinctly? It is one thing to be liable on a feigned warranty of authority, and another, to be liable "on the instrument."
Validity of an Infant's Endorsement
The endorsement of the instrument "by a corporation
or by an infant," says the 22d Sect. "passes the property
thereon" notwithstanding that from want of capacity the
corporation or infant may incur no liability thereon."
Prof. Ames' criticism that, if this means that the property
passes irrevocably it introduces a radical and considerable
change in the law as to the rights of infants, and, if it
means simply that the infant's endorsee has power to enforce payment from all parties prior to the infant, it is
ambiguous, is not answered by Mr. McKeehan's suggestion
that the title does pass by an infant's assignment, although
it may subsequently be retracted. Corporations and infants are coupled together. Is a corporation assignment
valid until revoked? If its endorsement is understood to
pass an indefeasible title, why should not the infant's be
understood to be intended likewise to pass an indefeasible
title?
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Forgery of a Signature
Sect. 23 declares that no right is acquired by a forged
or unauthorized signature, "unless the party against whom
it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting
up the forgery or want of authority." That is very like
saying that the forged signature is void unless it is
not void. If the intention was to provide for cases in
which one might be estopped from disputing the genuineness of the signature, or the authority of the person who
made it, some clearer expression might have been invented.
Consideration
Sect. 25 says, "An antecedent or pre-existing debt
constitutes value and "value is any consideration suffiAre "antecedent"
cient to support a simple contract."
and "pre-existing," two qualities, or but one? If the debt
pre-existed but does not continue to exist at the timd of
making the note, is it a consideration? If it continues,
how is it a pre-eisting debt? If a debt originating before
the note, but continuing until its making and after, is intended, why is some more accurate statement not devised?
Antecedent to what? While A owes B $50, he gives to B
for B's accommodation, a note for $5000. Is it not plain
that an antecedent debt is not a consideration unless the
existence of the debt is the motive of the making of the
note and an object of the making is either to increase the
creditors' security solely, or to increase it and thus obtain
extension of the credit, or some other supposed advantage?
The "value" in contemplation, is value to the maker of the
note, (for detriment to the. creditor is excluded) but how
can the fact that one is already indebted be a
What the inditers of the act inconsideration?
tended, was, that a note given to increase the
security of the creditor, should need no value to the maker,
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in order to support it. 7 Instead of frankly abolishing for
the occasion, the principle that consideration is necessary
to a contract, they pretend to save the doctrine by arbitrarily decreeing that that shall be deemed a consideration
which answers to no definition of that word.
The 26th section states that "where value has at any
time been given for the instrument, the holder is deemed
a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such
prior to that time." A makes a note for the accommodation of B. B asks C to endorse it, also for his accommodation. B then sells the note to D. Although, prior to
this transaction between B and D, no consideration affected
A or C, that sale, involving the detriment to D, of the
spending of his money, became a consideration for A's
making and C's endorsing.
Endorsement in Blank
Section 34 says that "An indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and an instrument so indorsed is payable
to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery."
Taken
literally this is inconsistent with Sect. 9, clause '5, which
says that an instrument is payable to bearer "when the only
or last endorsement is an endorsement in blank." This
seems to imply that if any other than the last, in a series
of endorsements is in blank, the instrument is not payable
to bearer.
Restrictive Indorsement
By Sect. 37 a restrictive endorsement confers on the
endorsee the "right to bring any action thereon, that the
endorser could bring." The endorser could not sue himself. Can the endorsee then, not sue him? If A endorsed,
for a consideration the note to B, for the use of C, B
7

Brooldyn City and N. R. Co. vs. Nat. Bank of Republic, 102
U- S. 14, where Harlan, J., strains his ingenuity to discover a
consideration in the duties assumed by the creditor towards the debtor with respect to the note.
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is a restrictive endorsee,. but he should have the power
to sue A on the endorsement. The section is defective, as
Prof. Ames points out, in not providing for this case.
Qualified Endorsement
Sect. 38 stating that a qualified endorsement "is made
by adding to the indorser's signature the words "without recourse," and that such an endorsement does not impair the
negotiable character of the instrument, nevertheless adds
that it constitutes the endorser a mere assignor of the title
to the instrument." An assignor is one who assigns. If
the indorser is a mere assignor, is the other party to the
act, a mere assignee? But, to so hold, is to make him liable to all the defenses to which his assignor would be liable.
There is a want of precision in the use of the expression
"mere assignor." What the enacters meant to say was that
an endorser could eliminate the usual incident of endorsement, viz, his conditional liability for the payment of the
instrument, without affecting its other incident, of passing the right to a bona fide endorsee, of enforcing the instrument according to its tenor.
Conditional Indorsement
Section 30 authorizes parties liable to pay, to pay the
endorsee, without heeding the condition annexed to the enIt adds, that the conditional endorsee, will
dorsement.
hold the instrument or the proceeds (when he receives payment of it) "subject to the rights of the person indorsing
conditionally." But, what are these rights? To recall the
note, or to demand the proceeds, if it has been paid? Why
use so vague a phrase?
Special Endorsement of Instrument
Sect. 40 directs that an instrument payable to bearer,
though specially endorsed, may be further negotiated by
delivery. Sect. 9, clause 5, as we have seen says that an
instrument is payable to bearer when the only or the last
If an instrument payable to
endorsement is in blank.
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order, is indorsed in blank, and is specially endorsed by a
subsequent holder, it is not, under section 9, payable to
bearer.
Under section 40, it apparently is payable to
bearer. The reconciliation of the two sections, as Charles
L. McKeehan, Esq., suggests, is effected, by supposing that
the enacters of the act, by the expression "Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is specially endorsed," meant
originally payable to bearer.
The section states that the person endorsing specially
an instrument payable to bearer "is liable as endorser to
only such holders as make title through his endorsement."
If a specially endorsed instrument may be negotiated by
delivery, the endorsement of the special endorsee is not
necessary to confer title on a holder. In what sense then,
does any subsequent holder "make title through his endorsement?"
Does a subsequent holder "make title through the indorsement," when he shows that he directly or indirectly
acquired the instrument from the endorser, by means of
the endorsement, although proof of such derivation would
not be necessary, in order to justify a recovery from the
maker or acceptor?
Transfer Without Indorsement
Section 40 declares that a transferee for value with
out indorsement acquires the title of the transferor, and
also the right to have the endorsement of the transferor.
But, if so, why is an actual endorsement necessary? Why
not treat, as done, that which ought to be done? A note
made for accommodation, is transferred by the payee to X
for full value, but without indorsement. Since the payee
could collect nothing on it, neither can his transferee. The
note is obtained by fraud, but is transferred to X, a purchaser without notice. X cannot enforce it, though he has
a right to an endorsement, because he has not in fact procured it. If after X has paid his money, he learns of the
fraud before he procures the indorsement, he is not pro-
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tected as a bona fide purchaser for value. Prof. Ames
is discontented, with reason, with this position. Mr. McKeehan is satisfied with it.
Infirmity in Instrument-Defect in Title
Two species of defects seem to be recognized in Sect.
54, 55, 56, and 57; infirmity in the instrument which is
not a defect of title, but constitutes a defense, and defect
in the title. The title of any person is said to be defective
when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto,
by fraud, duress or force and fear, or other - unlawful
means, or for an illegal consideration.
He also has the
power, apparently, to make his title defective ex post facto
If a payee obtains a promissory note by fraud, it would
seem that this circumstance is an infirmity in the instrument. But, it is also styled a defect in the title. Infirmity and defect seem there to be the same.
But although
there might be no infirmity in the note itself, a holder
later than the payee might have a defective title to it.
Fraud, duress, or force and fear, are enumerated as making a defective title. What is the difference between duress and force and fear? The lack of independent criticism in the compilers of the statute, is revealed in the retention of the words "force and fear." They are found in
the Bills of Exchange Act of England, and they were there
inserted because the Act was intended to operate in Scotland, where the word "duress" is unknown to the law. As
"duress" is known to the law of all the American states,
and "force and fear" is not a recognized equivalent, the
latter expression should have been omitted from the
American acts. Prof. Bunker naively observes, 8 "The introduction of these words into the American act shows
with what fidelity it follows the English statute."
There are two sorts of "defects" of right, with respect
to negotiable instruments; defects, based on fraud, duress,
gThe Negotiable Instruments Law, p. 107.
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illegal consideration in procuring the instrument's execution, and fraud in the negotiation of it, and defects not involving these facts, e. g. failure or want of consideration.
The holder in due course may enforce the instrument, despite either sort of defect, but, on proof of the first set
of facts (fraud, duress, etc.) the burden is put on the
holder who sues, to prove that he is or one under whom
he claims, was, a holder in due course. Sect. 59.
But is there any adequate reason for the retention
of this distinction? A defence is a defense. Why should
a defense of one sort compel affirmative proof by the
plaintiff that he is a holder in due course, and defence of
the other sort, not? If the character of the facts constituting the defence were such as in the one class to be proally known to the purchaser of the instrument, and in
the other class, not, there would be a reason for the distinction, but it is no more likely that the purchaser will know
that there was duress or fraud or illegality, than that he
will know that there was a want of consideration.
Notice of Infirmity
The 56th section explains that a holder, in order to
be held to have had notice of infirmity or defect of the
instrument must have had actual knowledge of it, or
"knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
instrument amounted to bad faith." The expression "bad
faith" is extremely vague.
If the facts known awaken
suspicion that something exists that would constitute a defence, does the holder take it in "bad faith?" The phrase
is not in the English Bills of Exchange Act. It should
not have been in the American act.
If the purpose
was to declare that negligence in purchasing a note or
bill should not be the equivalent of notice, why did its
author not say so? If it was the intention to say that if
the known facts generated a belief or a suspicion that
some defect existed, or that a specific defect existed, that
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would be a defence, why were not clear terms used to express it?
The 59th Sect. which puts on the holder the burden
of proving that he is a holder in due course, when it is
shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument was defective, contains the exception that in
a suit against a party who became bound on the instrument,
(e. g. the maker, the drawer, the acceptor, an endorser,)
before the title became defective, the burden will not be
on the plaintiff to prove that he is a holder in due course.
If A makes a note payable to B, to which A has, as against
B, no defence, and -C fraudulently obtains the note from
B, of which fact A, when sued by C could take advantage,
D a bona fide purchaser of the note, from C, will not,
when he sues A, be obliged to prove that he is a holder in
due course.9
Admissions of Maker, Acceptor, Drawer
The maker, drawer, acceptor "admita the existence
of the payee and his then capacity to endorse." Sect. 60,
61, 62. Admits when?
Only at the time of making,
Evidently not.
He continues to
drawing, accepting?
admit, when the last holder becomes such, and also when
a suit is being tried upon the instrument. But does he
simply admit? Or does he conclusively admit, so that no
denial is allowed? Clearly the last was intended. Why
was it not said?
But, is it true that the maker of a note admits the
A, erroneously thinking that
existence of the payee?
B, who was alive last year, is still alive, makes a note
payable to him, and delivers it to some one to be delivered
to him. Has he precluded himself from showing that B
did not exist when the note was made, or that he then
had the capacity to endorse? The existence and capacity
to endorse would be never relevant unless there had been
9Cf. Kinney v. Cruse, 28 Mo. 183; Voss v. Chamberlain, 139 Iowa
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an actual endorsement by some one who purported to be
the payee. If the payee were dead, such endorsement
would be a forgery and no title could be made through it.
The theory of admission of capacity to endorse would be
useless.
Section 62 states that the acceptor ipso facto "engages
that he will pay the bill according to its tenor." Then
follows the declaration that he admits certain facts to
exist. But, if he engages to pay, what more is necessary? How matters it, whether he admits or not? What
is meant is, evidently, that the acceptor engages to pay
the bill, whether the drawer existed or the bill was drawn
by him or not, whether, if he existed and drew, he had
the legal capacity to bind himself by drawing or not;
whether the payee existed or had legal capacity to endorse
or not.
An endorsee must prove the actual endorsement of
the payee. In -doing so he proves the existence and the
capacity to endorse. What is then the use of the admission of the acceptor that he exists and has, at the moment
of receiving the acceptance, the capacity to endorse?
Endorsement Before Delivery
Clause 2 of Section 64 provides that when one, not a
party puts his signature to the instrument before delivery, if the instrument is payable to the order of the maker
of a note or the drawer of a bill, or is payable to bearer,
he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or
drawer. As Prof. Ames points out, this fails to make one
who endorses a bill for the accommodation of the acceptor, liable as he should be to the drawer.
Warranties
A transferror, of an instrument, without indorsement,
or with endorsement without recourse, is not liable as indorser. But he is liable as a warrantor.
He warrants
that the instrument is genuine; that it is his, that prior
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parties had capacity to contract, and that he knows no fact
which would impair the validity of the instrument, or render it valueless. A distinction absolutely without justification, is drawn between transfers without endorseIn the
ment and transfers by qualified endorsement.
former the warranty is available to the immediate transferee only. Impliedly, in the latter, it is available to any
later transferee, that is the warranty is negotiable. Mr.
McKeehan's statement that when there has been no indorsement, there has been no assignment of the warranty
is no sufficient answer. The instrument has been negotiated. Negotiation would have passed the warranty, had
the act said so. Its refusing to say so, while saying that
an endorsement without recourse does pass the warranty
The function of an
is wholly arbitrary and illogical.
endorsement without recourse is exactly the function of a
delivery of an instrument payable to bearer. If the latter
negotiates both the instrument and the warranty, so
should the former.
What are the liabilities of the endorser without qualification? The 66th section says there are two. He warrants and he engages. He warrants, besides the genuineness of the instrument, besides his title to it, besides the capacity of all prior parties to contract, that the instrument
is at the time of his endorsement, valid and subsisting.
But, when one endorses for accommodation, does he warrant that he has a good title to the instrument endorsed?
Plainly not. Prof. Ames and Mr. McKeehan justly criticise the act for imposing a warranty on one who, not being
the owner and not professing to sell the instrument, simply
endorses it. The liability of endorser and that of warrantor are not of equal scope. The endorser is not liable until
the instrument matures. The warrantor is liable at once.
The warrantor's liability is not contingent on demand of
payment at maturity and notice of dishonor. That of endorser is so contingent. The liability of the warrantor is
for the damage resulting from the breach, the price paid
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being the maximum recoverable sum.
That of the indorser is for the face of the instrument with interest, however much less the consideration paid for it by the plaintiff.
We have again an instance of the tendency to make
unwarrantable distinctions.
The seller of a note or bill
without indorsement warrants not the validity or the value
of the instrument, but his ignorance of any fact which
could impair that validity or value. The indorser warrants
the validity, (but not the value). If the indorser warrants
validity, whether he has knowledge or not, why does the
seller of the instrument without indorsement not do the
same ?
The indorser "engages" to pay the instrument, on the
doing of certain acts by the holder, without obtaining payment, but the doing of these acts is not necessary to consummate the liability as warrantor.
Joint Endorsers
Joint payees or joint endorsees who indorse, says Sect.
68, are deemed to endorse jointly and severally.
Prof.
Ames and Mr. McKeehan object that if this is so, joint
makers ought likewise to be jointly and severally liable.
And why not?
Presentment of Instrument Payable on Demand
Sect. 71 directs that presentment for payment of a bill
of exchange, payable on demand, may be made within a
reasonable time after the last negotiation, but presentment
of any other negotiable instrument must be made on the
day it, falls due. Why was this distinction made? The
negotiation of a note which is negotiable, must be anticipated as well as that of a bill. Why must the former be
presented within a reasonable time after its issue, but the
latter only within a reasonable time after the last negotiation? Literally interpreted, no regard is to be paid to the
intervals between the negotiations, when there are several.
A bill payable on demand is negotiated 4 years after its
issue. Demand is made for payment three days thereafter.
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The demand is in time! No distinction is made between
notes or bills payable on demand with interest and those
not bearing interest. The interest bearing property of the
instrument does not prolong the period of permissible delay in presenting for payment.10
Person To Whom Presentment Is To Be Made
The 72d Sect. states that presentment must be made
"to the person primarily liable on the instrument, or, if he
is absent or inaccessible, to any person found at the place
Absent, means absent
where the presentment is made."
from the "proper place" for making presentment. What
Possibly inaccessible at that
does "inaccessible" mean?
place? Why use a phrase which fails to allay a doubt?
Place of Presentment
Sect. 73 enacts that when no place of payment is specified and no address is given, it is proper to present "at the
usual place of business or residence of the person to make
payment." This gives the holder the option to present at
either place. The English Bill of Exchange Act gives precedence to the place of business, if known, and allows presentment at the "ordinary residence," only when the place
of business is not known.
Presentment Unnecessary
The drawer cannot insist that presentment should be
made, when he has no right to expect or require that the
drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument, says Sect. 79.
What is a right to expect? Can it exist, when there is no
right to require? Does the friendship of the drawee, does
his past habit of paying the drawer's bills, give a right to
he will pay the bill?
or require
expect
When
a note that
is made, or a bill accepted for the accommodation of the indorser, says section 80, his duty to pay
IoCommercial Nat. Bank of Syracuse v. Zimmerman, 185 N. Y.
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is not contingent upon the making of presentment to the
acceptor or maker, if he has no reason to expect that the
instrument will be paid if presented. The Illinois act may
have done well, in omitting the reference to a reason to
Why should the party accommodated,
expect payment.
have reason to expect the accommodator to pay?
Presentment is unnecessary when reasonable diligence
to make it has been unsuccessful; when the drawee and acceptor of a bill is a fictitious person, and when presentment has been expressly or impliedly waived.
Failure to Give Notice of Dishonor
The 89th section requires notice of dishonor to be
given to the drawer and endorsers, on pain of discharging
drawer or indorsers who are not notified. No exception
is made, in the case of a check which the bank fails to pay.
Sect. 186 discharges the drawer of the checks only to the
extent of the loss incurred to him by delay in presenting
Prof Ames and Mr. McKeehan call attention to the
it.
failure of section 89 to except the case of the check.
Discharge of Instrument
Among the acts which, according to Sect. 119 will discharge a negotiable instrument, is any act "which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money." Prof.
As a simple
Ames styles this a "startling innovation."
by
discharged
will
be
contract for the payment of money
disclause
this
due,
a payment made before it becomes
charges a bill or note, when paid before due. But, suppose it is reissued before maturity by the maker or acceptor, and comes to a holder in due course. Can payment
to him not be enforced? Not, if the 4th clause of Sect.
Mr. McKeehan thinks it "unbeliev119 is carried out.
able" that the courts will give effect to it.
Discharge of Person Secondarily Liable
Sect. 120 declares that a person who is secondarily
liable on the instrument shall be discharged "by the dis-
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charge of a prior party." This is characterized by Prof.
Ames as the "most mischievously revolutionary provision
in the new code." A discharge by the statute of limitations, by the death of a surety to the principal maker, by
the failure to give notice of dishonor to a prior endorser,
would discharge a later party, in violation of the doctrine
Judge Brewster makes the clause
accepted theretofore.
mean a discharge of a prior party by the holder. Possibly"
the courts will accept this interpolation.
The person secondarily liable is by the 5th clause also
discharged "by a release of the principal debtor," unless the
releasing party expressly reserves his right of recourse
against the party who is secondarily liable. If by "principal debtor" is meant the person ultimately liable for the
debt, no objection could be made to this clause. But, if it
means the "person primarily liable in the instrument," it
would make a discharge of a maker for accommodation, d
discharge of the party accommodated, an inequitable result.
The 6th clause discharges a person secondarily liable,
by agreement binding on the holder to extend the time of
payment or to postpone the right to enforce the instrument, unless the party secondarily liable assents to the
agreement, or unless the right of recourse against him is
expressly reserved. Why should an extension of time to
the maker or acceptor for accommodation discharge an accommodated drawer or endorser?
The criticism of Dean
Ames is fully justified..
Alteration of Instrument
Sect. 124 enacts that "where a negotiable instrument
is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable
thereon, it is avoided," for all except these who made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers." It is to be noted that no exception is made of alterations made by strangers to the instrument.
An alteration by whomsoever, avoids the instrument.

Dickinson Law Review
When the instrument however, after alteration, is in
the hands of a holder in due course who is not a party to
it, "he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor."
Number of Drawees
Sect. 128 enacts that "a bill may be addressed to two
or more drawees jointly, whether they are partners or not;
but not to two or more drawees in the alternative or in succession." Both the English Bills of Exchange Act and the
American act prevent the addressing of a bill to two or
Some earlier cases apmore persons in the alternative.
parently realized no difficulty in allowing such address.1
The 131st Sect. allows the drawer or any endorser of a
bill to insert in it the name of a "referee in case of need,"
to whom resort may, at the option of the holder, be had in
case the bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment. It is difficult to understand why two or more alThe 141st
ternative drawees should not be permitted.
section allows the acceptance of some one or more of the
drawees. Strange, then, that the drawees could not be
alternatively named.
Acceptance
Sect. 134 prescribes that when an acceptance is on
some other paper than the bill itself, it binds the acceptor
only towards a person to whom it is shown, and who, on the
faith thereof, receives the bill for value. If it is put on
the bill itself, even after the bill has been bought, the holder
may enforce the acceptance, though he did not buy the
bill in reliance upon it, a distinction which it would be difficult to justify. If reliance on the acceptance is not necessary to make it enforceable in one case, it should not be
necessary in the other. A written promise to accept a bill,
before it is drawn is deemed an actual acceptance (Sect.
111 Daniel on Negot. Ist.

p. 121.
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135) in favor of one who, upon the faith thereof, receives
the bill for value.
Contructive Acceptance
Sect. 137 enacts that 'Where a drawee to whom a bill
is delivered for acceptance destroys the same, or refuses
within 24 hours after such delivery, or within such other
period as the holder may allow to return the bill accepted or
non-accepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same." As critics of this act have observed, the destruction of a bill is a singular way of accepting it.
To.
fail or. neglect to return the bill within 24 hours, is to re2
fuse to return it, and is an acceptance.
PresentmentFor Acceptance
There are cases (Sect. 143) in which presentment for
acceptance must be made. In other cases, it is not necessary. In the first class of cases, the holder must either
present it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable
time. If he fail to do so, the drawer and all indorsers are
discharged. But, if the bill is not presented but negotiated
within a reasonable time, is the duty of presentment discharged? If not, when must it be made? The act yields
no answer. Sect. 145 contains the provision that when the
drawee has become a bankrupt or insolvent, or has made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, presentment may
be made to him or to his trustee or assignee. The acceptance imposes an obligation not theretofore existing. Under what circumstances the trustee or assignee can create
this obligation, the act does not disclose.
12Wisner v. First Nat. Bank, 220 Pa. 20. The act of April 27th,
1909, P. L. 260 has declared that the retention of a bill, unless its
return has been demanded, shall not amount to an acceptance; and
as excepted checks from the operation of the 137th section. The
section however, thinks Brannan (The Negotiable Instruments Law,
p. 136) does not apply to checks which are not presented for acceptance or certification.
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Notice of Non-Acceptance
When a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, Sect. 102,
notice must be given within the times mentioned in Sects.
103 and 104. Sect. 150 enacts that the person presenting
the bill must treat it as dishonored by non-acceptance, or
he loses the right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers. Even when presentment for acceptance is at the
option of the holder, if he in fact presents, and fails to
obtain acceptance, he must treat the bill as dishonored,
and give immediate notice to the drawer and indorsers;
otherwise they will be discharged. 13 And, on the giving of
this notice, he has an immediate right of recourse against
the drawer and indorsers. No presentment for payment is
necessary. (Sect. 152). 4
The former law of Pennsylvania in this respect, seems
to be set aside by the Negotiable Instruments Act. A bill
was drawn in Philadelphia on a merchant in Londonderry,
Ireland, payable to a third person at 60 days sight. Such
a bill had to be presented for acceptance. It was so presented, but acceptance was not obtained. Nor was notice
given to the payee who had indorsed the bill, and who was
defendant in an action thereon, by a subsequent indorsee.
The bill was subsequently protested for non-payment; and
notice thereof was duly given to the defendant. A judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.'5 In 'House v. Adams
& Co.' 6 the bill was payable six months after date.. Reed,
J., observed that presentment for acceptance of a bill payable at a certain period after date is unnecessary, and that,
in Pennsylvania the drawer is not discharged for want of
provided he receives notice of
notice of non-acceptance
7
non-payment.

"Eaton and Gilbert, Commercial Paper, p. 592.
"4Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. 202; Weldon v. Buck, 4 Johns. 144;
Winthrop v. Pepoon, 1 Bay (S. C.) 468; Watson v. Loring, 3 Mass.
557; Lennox v. Cook, 8 Mass. 460.
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While the Negotiable Instruments Act authorizes a
suit immediately on dishonor by non-acceptance, it says
nothing as to the amount that would be recoverable in such
suit. Would it be the face of the bill with interest from the
time of dishonor, or would it be the present worth at that
time, of the bill, if payable at some future time, with interest thereon?
Payment For Honor
Sect. 175 enacts that "where a bill has been paid for
honor, all parties subsequent to the party for whose honor
it is paid, are discharged, but the payer for honor is subrogated for, and succeeds to both the rights and duties of
the holder, as regards the party for whose honor he pays,
and all parties liable to the latter." This rule was laid
down by Lord Erskine in 1808, in Ex parte Lambert, 13
Ves. 179. In 1868, in Ex parte Levan, Malins, V. C. condemned this doctrine and decided that the payer for honor
should have. the rights of the holder against the person
for, whose honor he pays and all parties prior (not liable)
to him. Prof. Ames thinks the overruled case adopted into
the code by an oversight.
Not so Judge Brewster, nor
Mr. McKeehan. These gentlemen think the rule of Lord
Erskine preferable, and that it was consciously preferred
by the codifiers.
Time For Presenting a Check
A check must be presented for payment, says Sect.
186, "within a reasonable time after its issue, or the drawer
will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of
the loss caused by the delay." A check, says Sect. 185, is
a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand.
Except as provided in the act, the provisions of the act
applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand, apply
15

Reed, Adm. v. Adams, 6 S. & R. 356.

1648 Pa. 261.
l7Citing Reed v. Adams, 6 S. & R. 356.
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to a check. Sect. 89 declares that when a negotiable instrument (therefore a bill of exchange, a check) has been
dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment, notice of
dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each indorser,
otherwise such drawer or indorser is discharged. Hence,
failure to give notice to the drawer of the non-payment of
a check by the bank on which it is drawn, should discharge
him. But, if delay in presenting the check does not discharge, altogether, but only to the extent of loss caused by
the delay, failure to give notice of the bank's refusal to
pay the check ought not to discharge altogether, but ought
to discharge only to the extent of the consequent loss.
Judge Brewster concedes that the effect of failure to give
notice ought to be the same in both cases. For not saying
so, the act is clearly amenable to the criticism which Prof.
Ames and Mr. .McKeehan make of it.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. JONLET
Criminal Law-Assault With Intent to Kill-Constructive Intent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jonlet shot at Smith with the intention of killing him, but hit
and wounded Anshon accidently. Jonlet was indicted for an assault with intent to kill.
Todd, for plaintiff.
Balogh, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WEISS, J. Where a person engaged in the commission of a
crime that is malum in se does an act unintended by him, the intent to commit the crime in which he was engaged is carried oveil
to the act done, and supplies the intent necessary to make the act
dote a crime. The intent in such case is called "constructive intent." Clark Crim. Law, p. 56.
An intent to do some other wrongful act from the doing of
which the forbidden act results as an unintended consequence is
called constructive intent. 18 D. L. R. 259.
Referring to the facts we note that Jonlet shot at Smith with
the intention of killing him, but hit and wounded Anshon accidently.
No one will deny that Jonlet was engaged in committing an
act malum in se, when he shot at Smith with the intention of
killing him- It is not essential to the constitution of a crime that the
accused should commit the very act intended by him and therefore,
when a man does one wrongful act while intending to dq anotherf,
he may be criminally liable for the latter. It is true that Jonlet
never actually had the specific intent to -shoot Anshon, but the actual crimnal intent, or guilty mind in the first instance concurring
with the act already done, is enough to constitute a crime.
The
intent in such cases may be construed and is absolutely essential,
if guilt is to he affixed upon defendant in this case.
For example, if a man shoot at a fowl with intent to steal it,
and accidently kill a man, he is guilty of homicide; or where several persons co-operate to rob, and while pursuing their object the
person assailed is killed, all are guilty of homicide. State v. Barrett, 40 Minn. 71.
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In Ruling Case Law 531. It is a correct proposition that every
person is liable for the direct, natural and probable consequence of
his own act, and that everyone doing an unlawful act is considered
the doer of all that follows. Likewise, where one puts in motion a
missile with a specific intention of hitting another therewith, but
through poor aim or the agility of the person aimed at, the object
misses him and hits another, the aggressor is liable for the injury
caused. Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130; Dunaway v. People, 110
Ill. 333.
In the case at bar, Jonlet was indicted for an assault with intent to kill Anshon and the court is of the opinion that the in-,
dictment was correct. Clarke, Crim. Law, 3rd Ed. p. 259, note 3
states that, "Shooting at one person with intent to- kill him and
hitting another, is an assault with intent to kill the latter."
In State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, the indictment charged an assault with intent to kill. It appeared that defendant deliberately
discharged a loaded gun into a crowd. It was held proper to charge
the jury that the intent to kill characterizes the act, goes with it
and, if the blow reaches any person, it carries with it the criminal
intent to kill and murder; if it takes effect upon a person other
than the one intended, the crime is made out precisely the same
as though the intention had been to kill and murder the person ehit.
State v. Jump, 90 Mo. 171: We have a case analogous to the
one under consideration. The prisoner was indicted for an assault
upon W. J. Martin with intent to kill. He had really intended
to kill Mitchell. The court held that, "one who threw a stone at
another and struck a 3rd person not intended, was rightly convicted
of an assault with intent to kill the latter."
Again in Wareham v. Ohio, 25 Ohio State 601, the indictment
read for the murder of one David Kirby. He had intended to take
the life of Carpenter. The doctrine was that where one person purposely and maliciously strikes with intfnt to kill one person and
the blow takes effect upon and kills another, the slayer is guilty of
murderer."
Commonwealth v. Breyessee, 160 Pa. State 451 held "Where a
deliberate purpose is found to kill one person and the defendant
fires a pistol at him for that purpose the fact that the bullet misses
its intended victim and kills another person does not relieve the
murderer.
37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172 (Note)-It is well settled that one who
in attempt to kill another person, injures a third, is guilty of an assault with intent to murder the latter. State v. Montgomery, 91
Missouri 52; Louisiana v. Thomas, 127 La. 576; Vandermark v. People, 47 Ill. 122.
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In view of the fact that the doctrine of constructive intent is
predominant in this commonwealth, we are constrained to decide that
the indictment was regular and all proceedings thereunder are therefore affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
It has been held that where a statute makes criminal "an
assault with intent to kill" a person intending to shoot A but accidently shooting B can be properly convicted of an "assault upon
B with "intent to kill." St. v. Thomas, 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868. The
theory of this holding is that under such a statute and indictment
an interest to kill anyone is sufficient. See also St. v. Gilman,
69 Me. 163.
Such cases must be distinguished from those, in which, under a
statute making criminal an assault upon a person with intent to kill
such person, it has been held that a person intending to shoot A
but accidentally shooting B cannot be convicted (St. v. Mulhall, 199
Me. 202, P. v. Keefer, 18 Cal. 636) contra. Callahan v. S. 21 0.
S. 306.
In the present case if the defendant had been indicted for
assault upon Anshon with intent to kill Anshon, a conviction would
have been proper.
Does the fact that the indictment goes beyond the terms of
the statute and alleges an intent to kill the person hit require the
statute to prove an intention to kill the person hit?
The weight of authority appears to answer this question in
the affirmative. St. v. Shanley, 20 S. D. 18; 26 H. & R. 452. But
the contrary doctrine is supported by very respectable authority.
Waler v. St., 8/ Ind. 290; St. v. Gallagher (N. J.) 85 Atl. 207.
In Mays Criminal Law it is said, 'Where one shoots at A and
hits B he may he indicted for an assault with intent to kill, but
where one shoots at A and hits B an indictment for an assault upon
B with intent to kill B is not good, because the intent a$ now alleged n the more specific form cannot be established." p. 38. See
also 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630; 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 174, which contain
an exhaustive discussion of the cases. Judgment reversed.
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KOVEN v. INSURANCE CO.
Evidence-Insurance-Admissibility of Copy of Application, Under
Act of May 11, 1881, P. L. 20
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Henry Koven applied for insurance, to the extent of $5,000, on
his life. The application stated his age at 30 years and that his
father died at 62, of tuberculosis, and his mother at 70, of Bright's
Disease. The copy of the application erroneously stated the applicant's age as 20, and the death of his father at 60, and of his
mother at 65. At the trial the defendant endeavored to defeat a
recovery by showing that the "copy" was untrue in important respects, and offered the application for the purpose of proving this,
as by an admission. The court excluded the offer. Verdict for
the plaintiff. Motion for a new trial.
Gregg for plaintiff.
Gorson, for defenadnt.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LEE, J. The question involved is: Can the defendant introduce
the original application for insurance for the purpose of showing,
as by an admission, that the copy was untrue. This case is governed by the Act of May 11, 1881, P. L. 20, II. Purdon 1955, which is
as follows:
"All life insurance policies upon the lives or prosperity of persons within this commonwealth whether issued by companies organized under the laws of this state or by foreign companies doing
business therein, which contain any reference to the application of
the assured, or the constitution, by-laws, or other rules of the company either as forming part of the policy or contract between the
parties thereto or' having any bearing upon said contract, shall contain or have attached to said policies correct copies of the application as signed by the applicant and the by-laws referred to, and
unless so attached and accompanying the policy, no such application shall be received in evidence in a controversy between the
parties, or intrusted in, the said policy, nor shall such application
or by-laws be considered a part of the policy between such parties."
(1). "A copy is a true transcript of an original writing."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, page 436; Anderson's Law Dictionary,
page 257.
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(2). This act is in its nature penal, and must be strictly construed.
(a). Under Act May 11, 1881, If any use is to be made of the
application for insurance, there must be a correct copy thereof "as
signed by the applicant" attached to the policy. If no such copy appears, an alleged copy appended to the policy, not conforming to the
requirements of the act will be rejected by the court. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hallock, 22 W. N. C. 151; 14 Atl. 167.
(b). Morris v. Mutual Life Assur. Co., 183 Pa. 563, construes Act May 11, 1881. Where medical examiner's report is
part of application, but is not contained in copy of application attached to policy, the policy is not attached within meaning of the
act and is not admissible in evidence.
The policy here was physically attached to application, but not
within meaning of act.
(c). If act was passed to keep applicant's statements before his
eyes so that he might know his contract and rectify mistakes before
it is too late, nevertheless the act must be strictly construed.
(d). An application for the policy shall not be received in evidence unless attached to policy by Act May 11, 1881, and even if
there was a blank form of application on back with the words: "I
accept this as a copy of my application, but I agree that the original
shall be admitted as the correct application if copy varies therefrom,"
if it was not shown that the insured saw the pretended copy of the
application on back of the policy, it shall not be admitted. Zimmer v,Ins. Co., 207 Pa. 472. Here there is no evidence that plaintiff saw or read the policy. Furthermore the plaintiff is not seeking to introduce the original application and therefore there can
be no estoppel as against him as defendant contends.
(e). The application was rightly excluded from the testimony.
The provision of the act are conclusive on this point. No copy of
the application or of the by-laws of the company were attached to
the policy as the act requires; it constituted, therefore no part of the
policy of the contract between the parties and was not receivable in
evidence. The case is to be considered as if no such paper existed. Imperial Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa. 460 (473).
In the case at bar the defendant's own evidence shows there was
no correct copy attached to the policy as is expressly required by
the act. Here the act excludes the introduction of the original application in evidence.
(f). The company by the policy copy says to the insured that
his father and mother died at such ages and that the contract was
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madb upon that basis, and such is his contract. He thereupon relies
upon having made such representation. Then when suit is brought
on the policy, the insurer claims immunity on the ground that they
died at different ages and produces the application in evidence,
claiming that therefore it should tend to keep insurer from being
entrapped and negligent.
Since the act prohibits the introduction of application for any
purposes in evidence, it cannot be introduced to show an admission.
But for this act an insurance company could defraud all persons insured, by simply stating different ages in copy from that which were
in application.
III. Since the copy stated the age of Koven as 10 years less
than in application, this would tend to lessen amount of premiums
to be paid by Koven. The insurance company evidently knew this,
but for obvious reasons did not bring it out.
IV. In McCaslin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 59 Sup. 475, we
have a case practically on point. In that case in an action upon a
life insurance policy, the defendant alleged misrepresentations in the
application. The plaintiff avers that the paper attached to the policy
was merely a copy of the original application and produces a paper
which the testimony of a number of witnesses tends to show was the
original application, and an inspection of the paper shows that the
paper not attached to the policy represented that the mother of the
insured died at the age of 42 while that attached stated that she died
at 45 and the jury by its verdict established the fact tha-i the original application was not attached to the policy, all offers of evidence
reldting to misrepresentations as to the health of the insured in the
application are irrelevant and immaterial.
V. If a correct copy of the application is not attached to the
policy in accordance with the requirements of the Act May 11, 1881.
P. L. 20, it is not part of the contract and it is to be considered as if
no such paper existed and a recovery may be had upon the policy.
Imperial Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa. 460; Hebb v. Ins. Co., 138
Pa. 174; Haverstick v. Mut. Fire Assn., 156 Pa. 333.
In view of the above stated authority the defendant's offer of
the application in evidence was properly excluded and the question
is answered in the negative.
Motion for new trial refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The defendant in this case did not contend that the facts stated
in the application were false, but admitted that they are true and
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asked that the application be admitted in evidence to show that the
facts stated in the "copy" were false.
But what was the purpose which the defendant desired to subserve by proving that the "copy" was false. The act of 1881 was intended to protect the insured by imposing upon the insurer the duty
of attaching to the policy a "correct copy" of the application. To
permit the company to avail itself of its failure to perform this duty
for the purpose of avoiding liability upon the policy would be a plain
perversion of the purpose'of the act.
It does not appear that Koven ever saw the "copy" and it cannot be said that there was a duty upon him to read his policy for the
purpose of seeing whether a "correct copy" had been attached. "He
had the right to assume that, the appellant, as an honest insurance
company, had observed the law passed for his protection by attaching a correct copy of his application" and even if he had read the
policy "he would have found nothing upon it committing him to the
substitution of an incorrect for a correct copy of the application."
Zemmer v. Ins. Co., 207 Pa. 477. The language of the court in Robson v. Ins. Co., 51 Super. 495, "There was a mistake in the policy.
This was due to a mistake of some officer of the company. We
are now asked to visit the effect of this mistake upon the insured
and thus enable the company to profit by its own carelessness. The
decisions do not require us to do so. Where a mistake is chargeable
not to the insured but to the company's agent it should be imputed
to the company itself," is applicable to this case.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. CLOYD
STATEMENT -OF FACTS
Criminal Law-Arson-Evidence-Admissibility of Animal Traits
Indictment for burning a house.
Some evidence tending to
show the presence of Cloyd near the house being given, evidence
was offered of a bloodhound tracing the footsteps ob a man to
Cloyd's home, a quarter of a mile distant.
That the dog was of
pure blood, and had on at least fifty instances of trial been uniformly
successful in tracing the person was proved. The court allowed
the jury to consider this evidence in connection with other evidence.
Johnson for appellant.
Hollis, for Commonwealth.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
SAVIGE, J. The recognized rule is that the corpus delicti in arson consists of two elements, viz., (1) The element of burning, and
(2) the criminal agency in causing it. This observation is analogous
as a matter of evidence to the crime of murder, as to which the
rule is recognized that murder consists of two elements, (1) the fact
of the death of the deceased, which must be shown by direct testimony or presumption of the strongest kind, and (2) the fact of existence of criminal agency, which is the proper subject of presumptive reasoning. In murder or arson this evidence of criminal
agency need not be conclusive in character. The facts in the case
at bar state "some evidence tending to show" Cloyd's presence. It
is for this reason that corroborative evidence is given. It must be
noted that this piece of evidence of the tracing of the blood hound
is only in corroboration, and is not relied upon solely by the Commonwealth in establishing the conviction of Cloyd. If nothing appears but that the house was consumed by fire the presumption is
that it occurred thru accident and was not of incendiary origin.
This criminal agency or wilful firing by a responsible person may
be shown by such estimony as that of conversations or declarations
of the accused, or that he tried to intimidate witnesses who he
thought might appear against him. A more extrajudicial confession
of arson will not warrant a conviction of arson unless corroborated
by proof aliunde of the corpus delicti. Spears v. State of Miss., 16
L. R. A. (N. S.) 285. Also see the extracts of cases given in connection therewith in the notes. State of Kan. v. Glenn Adams, 35
L. R. A. (N. S.) 870.
From the foregoing it is obvious that the corroborative evidence
need not be the highest character of evidence. However, such testimony must be shown to be well founded. The leading authority on
this question is a case in which a new trial was granted because of
the admission of incompetent testimony, yet the court took the
pains of stating what it believed to he the law on this subject, and
its reasoning has been quite generally held as prevailing in later
cases. I refer to Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1723,
42 L. R. A. 432. Justice Da Relle says, "It is a matter of common
knowledge of which courts are authorized to take notice that dogs
of some varieties are remarkable for the acuteness of their sense of
smell ...........
In the above case four elements are laid as the foundation to
the admission of such evidence, to which, in our humble sense of justice we would add a fifth. To make such testimony competent it
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must appear (1) that the dog is of pure blood, and of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination; (2) that
the dog in question is possessed of these qualities; (3) that hei has
been trained or tested in the exercise of tracking human beings;
(4) that he was laid on the trail concerning which testimony has
been admitted at a point where circumstances tend to clearly show
that the guilty party had been, and (5) that the trailing was done
wihin such time after the alleged criminal act that there is but
slight chance that the accused has passed over the same route since,
and within such time beyond which it is reasonable to suppose that
the scent has so passed away that the olfactory nerves of the canine
would no longer be able to discriminate or follow the trail. Under
these circumstances the testimony may go to the jury for what it is
worth. It has been held that evidence that another dog of the same
breed as the one in the trial left a trail, traced and killed a; sheep
was inadmissible for the test cannot be by comparison. In Pedigo v.
Com., the dog had not been trained or tested. We infer that the
jury found all the foregoing requirements existing in this case when
it was first up for trial, and we accordingly rule that this evidence
was admissible.
The counsel for the appellant argues rather ingeniously and
with some show of reason that the testimony of a dog is inadmisThe
sible because he does not understand the nature of an oath.
purpose of the oath is to prevent deliberate falsifying, for a mistaken witness is not necessarily guilty of perjury, but who has ever
heard of a dog telling a deliberate falsehood? What motive of interest would prompt him to do so? It is also argued that there is
no privilege of cross examination. What questions that would be
directed that cannot be directed to the witnesses who lay the foundation of the testimony, which are also relevant to the issue, are
not set forth in substantiation of this contention; nor are we able to
see the weight of the argument. Guffy in a dissenting opinion in
Pedigo v. Com., says with more seeming confidence than any show
of reason "it seems to me the use of the blood hound properly belonged to the days of slavery, and to the bloody criminal code of the
Dark Ages; and inasmuch as the institution of slavery and the code
have ceased to exist the hound should be relegated to innocuous
desuetude." He might have syllogized thus: "The donkey was a
beast of burden during the Dark Ages; customs and institutions of
the Dark Ages has been supplanted by modern conveniences and
methods; therefore, the donkey must no longer be used as a beast
of burden, and likewise the cow must no longer be used as a means
of milk supply. Surely if dogs could trace slaves and criminals
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1000 years ago because those qualities were inherent, the same as
their powers of barking or baying, or their coveting the society of
man, they can do so today. Native qualities and powers in families
of the animal kingdori, while they are to a certain limited extent
subject to education and training, yet they do not change like styles
in the wearing apparel of the human family. We admit that this
phase of evidence, like all other expert testimony is comparatively
new in our system of judicial procedure, as is pointed out in State
of Ohio v. Benjamin Dickerson, 77 Ohio 34, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.)
341, at page 346-7. We cannot agree with Brott v. State, 70 Neb.
395; 63 L. R. A. 789.
Motion for new trial refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The defendant in this case was convicted upon the testimony
as to the conduct of the blood hound and "other evidence." What
the other evidence was, does not appear. The sole question before
this court is therefore, whether the testimony as to the conduct of
the blood hound was admissible.
Tho it has been stated that the admission of such evidence "is
a novel feature in our jurisprudence, and is attended with some
danger, against which courts must guard as the occaaion arises,
and when the circumstances are at all doubtful," the conclusion
reached by a large majority of the courts is that such evidence,
under certain limitations, all of which have been complied in this
case, is admissible. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec. 177, vol. 5,
sec. 177. C. v. Hoffman, 52 Super. 272; C. v. Nace, 59 Super 210.
Affirmed.

